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Abstract
In the last 20 years, Elmer
Driedger’s “modern principle” has
emerged as THE expression of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s pre-
ferred approach to statutory inter-
pretation. The authors examine this
fundamental development in Cana-
dian law, including the variable rela-
tions between Driedger’s quote and
the Court’s use of it, the different
circumstances in which the princi-
ple is invoked and its influence on
the caselaw of other superior courts
in the country. 
Follows an appraisal of the
impact of the “modern principle” on
Canadian law. The principle is shown
to serve three clearly different func-
tions. It is used in the interpretation
of statutes, it provides judges with
a justification framework for interpre-
tive decisions, and it is also instru-
mental in the legitimization of the
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Résumé
Depuis les 20 dernières années,
le « principe moderne » d’interpré-
tation législative énoncé par Elmer
Dreidger s’est imposé comme LA
référence en la matière à la Cour
suprême du Canada. Les auteurs
décrivent cette évolution fondamen-
tale du droit canadien, s’arrêtant
notamment aux relations variables
entre le texte de Driedger et l’usage
que la Cour en a fait, aux différentes
circonstances dans lesquelles le
principe est invoqué ainsi qu’à l’in-
fluence que le principe a pu avoir
sur la jurisprudence des autres tri-
bunaux supérieurs au pays.
Suit une évaluation de l’impact
du « principe moderne » en droit ca-
nadien. Les auteurs distinguent trois
fonctions du principe. Il se présente
comme une méthode d’interpréta-
tion ; il propose un cadre pour gui-
der les juges dans la justification
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judicial function in statutory inter-
pretation. 
No doubt, the “modern principle”
has brought about some advances
in the law relating to statutory inter-
pretation in Canada. However, the
author reckon that it constitutes an
over-simplified reflection of the ac-
tual practice of Canadian jurists, in-
cluding judges. As a result, Driedger’s
principle provides neither a valid
method for interpreting statutes nor
a suitable structure for the courts’
justification of interpretive decisions.
One should not see in it more than a
good starting point for statutory in-
terpretation.
des décisions relatives à l’interpré-
tation ; il contribue à la légitimation
des décisions judiciaires en matière
d’interprétation législative.
Certes, le « principe moderne » a fa-
vorisé certains progrès dans le droit
relatif à l’interprétation législative
au Canada. Toutefois, les auteurs
estiment qu’il s’agit d’une simpli-
fication exagérée de la démarche
effectivement suivie par les juristes
canadiens, y compris les juges. Par-
tant, le principe de Driedger ne peut
ni constituer une méthode adéquate
d’interprétation des lois, ni offrir aux
juges un cadre satisfaisant pour la
justification de leurs décisions en
matière d’interprétation. Tout au plus
peut on y voir un point de départ
valable pour toute démarche d’inter-
prétation.
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If professor Elmer Driedger of the Faculty of Law (common law),
University of Ottawa, had been asked whether he expected his
remarks on the “modern principle” of statutory interpretation to
have any effect on the judiciary in Canada, he would have most
likely remained humble, knowing perhaps better than anybody that
no one may predict the ways of courts. There is a further question,
probably more scholarly interesting and in any event surely less
speculative, which is whether the popularity of the citation has
been won at the price of the integrity of the author’s thoughts. If it
has, it would certainly not be the first (nor the last) time. Was it not
Karl Marx who once said: “All I know is I’m not a Marxist”1?
In the recent history of the Supreme Court of Canada, where a
consensus on legal issues or on an approach to addressing them is
anything but frequent, one exception is the “modern principle” of
statutory interpretation. This celebrated doctrinal contribution comes
from Driedger’s Construction of Statutes2, usually cited from the sec-
ond edition of the book, which reads:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an
Act are to be read in their entire context in their grammatical and ordi-
nary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act
and the intention of Parliament.3
A thorough search with the engine available on the website4 of
the Supreme Court of Canada reveals that, not only has this excerpt
been referred to often, but it appears to be the most popular author’s
citation ever5. Indeed, from its very first use in 1984, with Stubart
Investments Ltd. v. The Queen6, up to the end of our studied period
1 Karl Marx as quoted by Friedrich Engels in a letter dated 5 August 1890 to
Conrad Schmidt.
2 Elmer A. DRIEDGER, The Construction of Statutes, Toronto, Butterworths,
1974, at 67.
3 Elmer A. DRIEDGER, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed., Toronto, Butter-
worths, 1983, at 87.
4 See [http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/].
5 Especially in the last few years at the Supreme Court of Canada, that quote has
become something of an incantation that is uttered before proceeding with the
actual process of interpreting legislation. 
6 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 417 (hereinafter “Stubart”).
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on 1 January 2006 (more than twenty years later), there were no less
than 59 decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada7 making refer-
7 Beside the Stubart decision, the other 58 are: Vachon v. Canada (Employment
and Immigration Commission), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 417; Canadian National v. Canada
(Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; Thomson v. Canada (Deputy
Minister of Agriculture), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 385; Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R.
695; Canada v. Antosko, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 312; Québec (Communauté urbaine) v.
Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1
S.C.R. 686; Friesen v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103; Schwartz v. Canada, [1996]
1 S.C.R. 254; Alberta (Treasury Branches) v. M.N.R., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 963; Verdun
v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550; 2747-3174 Québec Inc. v.
Québec (Régie des permis d’alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 (hereinafter “Régie des
permis d’alcool”); Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp., [1997] 1
S.C.R. 411; R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.
(Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (hereinafter “Rizzo Shoes”); R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R.
688; Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R.
625; Best v. Best, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 868; Winters v. Legal Services Society, [1999]
3 S.C.R. 160; Francis v. Baker, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250; R. v. Davis, [1999] 3 S.C.R.
759; 65302 British Colombia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804; Will-Kare Pav-
ing & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 915; R. v. Araujo, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 992; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., [2001]
2 S.C.R. 867; Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1082; Law Soci-
ety of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113; Chieu v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84; Sarvanis v. Canada, [2002]
1 S.C.R. 921; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559
(hereinafter “Bell ExpressVu”); Lavigne v. Canada (Commissioner of Official Lan-
guages), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773; Macdonell v. Québec (Commission d’accès à l’infor-
mation), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 661; R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757; Harvard College
v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (hereinafter “Harvard
College”); Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 94; Barrie Public Utilities v.
Canadian Cable Television Assn., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Min-
ister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539; Parry Sound (District) S.S.A.B. v. O.P.S.E.U.,
Local 324, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157; R. v. Blais, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236; R. v. Clay, [2003]
3 S.C.R. 735; United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary
(City), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 485; Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge
Community College, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 727; Application under s. 83.28 of the Crim-
inal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; Mosanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superin-
tendent of Financial Services), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152; Épiciers Unis Métro-Richelieu
Inc., division “Éconogros” v. Collin, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 257; R. v. Clark, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 6; Marche v. Halifax Insurance Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 47; Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401; Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 667; Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005]
2 S.C.R. 539; Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 706; Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R.
141; Merk v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and
Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 771, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 425; Charlebois v. Saint
John (City), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 563; R. v. C.D., , [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668; Castillo v. Cas-
tillo, 2005 SCC 83.
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ences to Driedger’s words8; three other cases9 cited the third edi-
tion, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes10, by professor Ruth
Sullivan, where the “modern principle” became the “modern rule” of
statutory interpretation and was, in effect, recast in different terms11.
What is also worth emphasising is how Driedger’s quote is used
in all areas of the law and, in fact, in all facets of legal interpretation:
from tax law12 to human rights law13, from criminal law14 to family
law15, as well as to qualify legislation in constitutional challenges
8 These cases referred to the relevant passage more often in a unanimous or
majority set of reasons, although some references are in minority or dissenting
opinions only; there are instances where more than one set of reasons quote
Driedger. Finally, it is worth mentioning that in the large majority of cases, the
Supreme Court judges actually used an excerpt of the whole or part of the pas-
sage in question; only a few times did they refer to the author without quoting
him.
9 See: Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 415; Pointe-Claire (City)
v. Quebec (Labour Court), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015; Opetchesaht Indian Band v.
Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 119. In addition to these three cases, there were other
instances where both the second and the third editions of the work were referred
to, some with quotes some without: Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, supra,
note 7; Régie des permis d’alcool, supra, note 7; R. v. Gladue, supra, note 7;
Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), supra, note 7; Best v.
Best, supra, note 7; 65302 British Colombia Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 7; Chieu
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, note 7.
10 Ruth SULLIVAN, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed., Toronto &
Vancouver, Butterworths, 1994, at 131 and 132.
11 See infra, note 156. For a defence and explanation of her reformulation, see:
Ruth SULLIVAN, “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada”,
(1998-1999) 30 Ottawa L. Rev. 175.
12 See Stubart, supra, note 6; Symes v. Canada, supra, note 7; Canada v. Antosko,
supra, note 7; Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours,
supra, note 7; Friesen v. Canada, supra, note 7; Schwartz v. Canada, supra,
note 7; Alberta (Treasury Branches) v. M.N.R., supra, note 7; Royal Bank of Canada
v. Sparrow Electric Corp., supra, note 7; 65302 British Colombia Ltd. v. Canada,
supra, note 7; Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 7; Ludco
Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 7; R. v. Jarvis, supra, note 7; Markevich
v. Canada, supra, note 7.
13 See: Canadian National v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), supra, note 7;
Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, supra, note 7, para. 80, where Binnie J. for
the Court even wrote: “Such interpretative principles apply with special force in
the application of human rights laws” [emphasis added].
14 See: R. v. McIntosh, supra, note 7; R. v. Gladue, supra, note 7; R. v. Davis, supra,
note 7; R. v. Araujo, supra, note 7; R. v. Clark, supra, note 7; R. v. C.D., supra,
note 7.
15 See: Best v. Best, supra, note 7; Francis v. Baker, supra, note 7.
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(Charter16 cases17 or division of powers cases18), to interpret con-
stitutional19 or quasi-constitutional texts20, to construe delegated
legislation like regulations21 and by-laws,22 to interpret transitional
provisions in an enactment23; it was extended to Quebec civil law24
16 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11 (hereinafter “Char-
ter”).
17 See: Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), supra, note 7; R.
v. Sharpe, supra, note 7; R. v. Clay, supra, note 7; Application under s. 83.28 of
the Criminal Code (Re), supra, note 7.
18 See: R. v. Hydro-Québec, supra, note 7; Law Society of British Columbia v. Man-
gat, supra, note 7.
19 See: R. v. Blais, supra, note 7, where at issue was the Manitoba Natural Resources
Transfer Agreement, which is incorporated as Schedule 1 to the Constitution Act,
1930, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 26. At para. 16, the Court wrote:
“The starting point in this endeavour is that a statute – and this includes stat-
utes of constitutional force – must be interpreted in accordance with the mean-
ing of its words, considered in context and with a view to the purpose they were
intended to serve: see E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at
p. 87”.
20 See: Lavigne v. Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages), supra, note 7,
para. 25, where Gonthier J. wrote for the Court: “The Official Languages Act and
the Privacy Act are closely linked to the values and rights set out in the Consti-
tution, and this explains the quasi-constitutional status that this Court has
recognized to them as having. However, that status does not operate to alter the
traditional approach to the interpretation of legislation, defined by E.A. Driedger
in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87”. See also: Charlebois v. Saint
John (City), supra, note 7, dealing with the New Brunswick Official Languages
Act, S.N.B. 2002, c. O-0.5.
21 See: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 7, on the
interpretation of patent regulations.
22 See: Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., supra, note 7, on the interpreta-
tion of a municipal by-law.
23 See: Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, note
7; as regards the applicability of the “modern principle” to transitional provi-
sions, see para. 14 and 15.
24 See: Épiciers Unis Métro-Richelieu Inc., division “Éconogros” v. Collin, supra,
note 7, para. 21, where LeBel J. for the Court wrote: “However, this distinction
between the approaches to interpreting civil law and statute law has become
blurred as methods for interpreting legislation have evolved. The distinction is
practically non-existent today, as statute law is no longer automatically given a
narrow reading. This Court has discussed its preferred approach to interpreting
legislation on numerous occasions”. He then refers to the “modern approach”
and to case law citing Driedger.
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in order to construe Civil Code25 provisions and even once to help
interpret a contract26. Professions of faith over the years vis-à-vis
the “modern principle” include that it is the “prevailing and pre-
ferred”27 or the “established”28 approach, that it is the “appropriate
and proper”29 or the “traditional and correct”30 approach; Driedger’s
words would indeed be a “definitive formulation”31 which “best cap-
tures or encapsulates”32 the approach, even the “starting point”33
for statutory interpretation in Canada.
When extending the search to the country’s other superior
courts, one finds unequivocal confirmation of the extraordinary
influence of the writings. The grand total of references to Driedger’s
“modern principle” up to mid-2005, in federal courts and in supe-
rior courts of the provinces and territories – whatever edition of The
Construction of Statutes and be it a direct quote, a reference to the
passage, or an indirect endorsement via a Supreme Court of Canada
25 Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64.
26 See: Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin, supra, note 9, para. 41, per L’Heureux-
Dubé J. (dissent), where she wrote, before referring to the third edition of
Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, op. cit., note 10: “Therefore, the ‘mod-
ern contextual approach’ for statutory interpretation, with appropriate adapta-
tions, is equally applicable to contractual interpretation”.
27 See: Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, note 7,
para. 27; Sarvanis v. Canada, supra, note 7, para. 24; Bell ExpressVu, supra,
note 7, para. 26; Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge Community
College, supra, note 7, para. 25; Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code
(Re), supra, note 7, para. 34; Épiciers Unis Métro-Richelieu Inc., division “Écono-
gros” v. Collin, supra, note 7, para. 21; Marche v. Halifax Insurance Co., supra,
note 7, para. 54; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), supra,
note 7, para. 96; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 7, para. 186. 
28 See: Mosanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), supra,
note 7, para. 19.
29 See: C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), supra, note 7, para. 106; Parry
Sound (District) S.S.A.B. v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, supra, note 7, para. 41.
30 See: Lavigne v. Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages), supra, note 7,
para. 25; 65302 British Colombia Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 7, para. 5.
31 See: Bell ExpressVu, supra, note 7, para. 26; Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian
Cable Television Assn., supra, note 7, para. 20 and 86.
32 See: Rizzo Shoes, supra, note 7, para. 21; R. v. Sharpe, supra, note 7, para. 33;
Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 7, para. 36.
33 See: Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn., supra, note 7,
para. 20; R. v. Clay, supra, note 7, para. 55; Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec
Inc., supra, note 7, para. 114.
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case resorting to Driedger – is astonishing, namely 724 references34.
Beside the expected popularity of the “modern principle” with the
statutory adjudicative body that are the federal courts, two pieces of
statistics are worth pointing out. First, in absolute numbers and
even more so in relative terms based on population, it is by far Brit-
ish Columbia which has been the most enthusiastic jurisdiction to
resort to Driedger. Second, even if the different legal system in the
civil law province of Quebec has not acted as a bar to the use of the
quote, again especially in relative terms, it has occurred much less
frequently.
The hypothesis here is that the “modern principle” of statutory
interpretation has been utilised by the courts in Canada to fulfil a
rhetorical function, that is to explain and justify in objective terms
the interpretative decision; this role is distinct and separate from its
other more obvious function, namely to provide an outline of meth-
ods that guide judges in the construction of statutes. It is argued
that, in contrast with Driedger who merely intended the latter, the
Supreme Court of Canada has attributed and given high impor-
tance to the former role of the quote in order to promote the legiti-
macy of the judicial role in construing the legislative norms adopted
by Parliament, the elected body of Government. For this demon-
stration, it is first necessary to have a fresh look at the Driedger’s
34 The breakdown by jurisdiction is as follows: 188 references at the federal
courts, that is 51 at the Federal Court of Appeal and 137 at the Federal Court
(Trial Division); 77 references in Alberta, that is 23 at the Court of Appeal and
54 at the Queen’s Bench; 160 references in British Columbia, that is 60 at the
Court of Appeal and 100 at the Supreme Court; 22 references in Manitoba, that
is 14 at the Court of Appeal and 8 at the Queen’s Bench; 38 references in New
Brunswick, that is 26 at the Court of Appeal and 12 at the Queen’s Bench;
31 references in Newfoundland and Labrador, that is 14 at the Supreme Court
(Appeal Division) and 17 at the Supreme Court (Trial Division); 8 references in
the Northwest Territories, that is 1 at the Court of Appeal and 7 at the Supreme
Court; 39 references in Nova Scotia, that is 18 at the Court of Appeal and 21 at
the Supreme Court; 62 references in Ontario, that is 21 at the Court of Appeal
and 41 at the Superior Court of Justice; 5 references in Prince Edward Island,
that is 2 at the Supreme Court (Appeal Division) and 3 at the Supreme Court
(Trial Division); 31 references in Quebec, that is 13 at the Court of Appeal and
18 at the Superior Court; 59 references in Saskatchewan, that is 30 at the Court
of Appeal and 29 at the Queen’s Bench; 4 references in Yukon, that is 1 at the
Court of Appeal and 3 at the Supreme Court; and there has been no reference so
far in Nunavut. These data may be found in a schedule to this paper, posted at:
[http://www.droit.umontreal.ca/profs/stephane.beaulac/documents.html].
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contribution and to see what interpretive methods it has supported
at the Supreme Court of Canada (Section I). The discussion then
moves to the impact of the “modern principle” on the work of Cana-
dian courts, having in mind the dual function of statutory interpre-
tation arguments as well as the legitimacy concerns pertaining to
the judicial process of construction (Section II).
I. The “Modern Principle” Reconsidered 
and Exposed
Also analysing the “modern principle” of statutory interpreta-
tion, Ruth Sullivan made the following apposite remarks about the
citation: “Over the years, however, it has come to mean different
things to different judges, and little attention has been paid to what
is apparently meant to Driedger”35. This is with what the discussion
begins, namely an inquiry into the author’s intention as regards the
famous passage (Section A); then the survey of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada highlights how, in spite of the unfailing
references to Driedger, there is a continuing lack of consistency in
methods of construing statutes in our highest court (Section B).
A. A Fresh Look at Driedger’s Construction of Statutes
It is in a separate chapter of the Construction of Statutes36, enti-
tled “The Modern Principle of Construction”, that Elmer Driedger
coins the expression. In fact, it is Chapter 4 of his book, which follows
chapters on “The Ordinary Meaning”37, “Departure from the Ordi-
nary Meaning”38 and “Construction by Object or Purpose”39. More
specifically, the excerpt always cited by courts appears at the end of
that seven-page chapter, under the heading “Modern Principle”, in
concluding remarks that take less than half of a page. The passage
follows a discussion of the three traditional rules of statutory inter-
pretation in the common law tradition, namely the “Mischief Rule”40,
35 R. SULLIVAN, loc. cit., note 11, 215.
36 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3, at 81ff. 
37 Id., at 1ff.
38 Id., at 47ff.
39 Id., at 73ff.
40 Id., at 81 and 82.
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the “Literal Rule”41 and the “Golden Rule”42. Driedger’s analysis
includes, inter alia, the three most significant cases from the English
common law associated with each of these rules, namely the Heydon’s
case43, the Sussex Peerage case44 and the case of Grey v. Person45,
respectively.
It is of course very pertinent that the Driedger’s citation intro-
ducing the “modern principle” comes after a sort of summary of the
three uncontested ways in which common law courts have dealt with
statutes. It suggests that a proper interpretation shall take into
account the object of the enactment (Mischief Rule), the words with
which it is expressed (Literal Rule) and the harmony among its pro-
visions and other statutes (Golden Rule); not one of them, or two of
them, but all three aspects may be relevant and be taken into
account. This statement is surely far from revolutionary though.
Put another way, when the passage is placed in its original context
of utterance, Driedger seems to have intended no more than a syn-
opsis of the three classic rules of legislative interpretation.
Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has transformed Driedger’s
thoughts into what appears to be a sweeping proclamation of the
one and only approach that must be used in the construction of
statutes. But reading Construction of Statutes46 leaves the impres-
sion that the “modern principle” is not prescriptive in nature, but
merely descriptive of the actual interpretive practice of the time.
Evidence of this can be found in the sentence that immediately fol-
lows the quote, which reads: “This principle is expressed repeatedly
by modern judges, as, for example […]”47; then come references to
previous decisions48. Also, proof that the passage in question was
not meant to be comprehensive or conclusive in itself can be had
41 Id., at 82-84.
42 Id., at 85 and 86.
43 (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 E.R. 637.
44 (1844), 11 Cl. & R. 85, 8 E.R. 1034.
45 (1857), 6 H.L.C. 61, 10 E.R. 1216.
46 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3.
47 Id., at 87.
48 Id. The two cases are: Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang, [1965] A.C. 182, 222 and
R. v. Mojelski (1968), 95 W.W.R. 565, 570. Then Driedger refers to, and also
quotes from, another, older, case, Victoria (City) v. Bishop of Vancouver Island,
[1921] A.C. 384, 387.
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from the very last sentence with which ends this half-a-page final
part of Chapter 4: “The remaining chapters [some 9 of them] of this
work seek to explain how an Act is to be so read and how problems
that may be encountered on the way are to be solved”49. Thus the
“modern principle” is obviously not the whole story.
Its mere restatement function is confirmed by the extended con-
text of the work Construction of Statutes50. One example shall suf-
fice, namely what the author writes at the beginning of Chapter 6,
entitled “The Method of Construction”, under the heading “The
Steps”:
The decisions examined thus far indicate that the provisions of an enact-
ment relevant to a particular case are to be read in the following way:
1. The Act as a whole is to be read in its entire context so as to ascertain
the intention of Parliament (the law as expressly or impliedly enacted by
the words), the object of the Act (the ends sought to be achieved), and the
scheme of the Act (the relation between the individual provisions of the
Act).
2. The words of the individual provisions to be applied to the particular
case under consideration are then to be read in their grammatical and
ordinary sense in the light of the intention of Parliament embodied in the
Act as a whole, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, and if they
are clear and unambiguous and in harmony with that intention, object
and scheme and with the general body of the law, that is the end.
3. If the words are apparently obscure or ambiguous, then a meaning
that best accords with the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act
and the scheme of the Act, but one that the words are reasonably capa-
ble of bearing, is to be given them.
4. If, notwithstanding that the words are clear and unambiguous when
read in their grammatical and ordinary sense, there is disharmony
within the statute, statutes in pari materia, or the general law, then an
unordinary meaning that will produce harmony is to be given the words,
if they are reasonably capable of bearing that meaning.
5. If obscurity, ambiguity or disharmony cannot be resolved objectively
by reference to the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act or the
scheme of the Act, then a meaning that appears to be the most reason-
able may be selected.51
49 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3.
50 Id. 
51 Id., at 105.
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Similarly to what he did at the end of Chapter 4, here Driedger
elaborates upon the three traditional rules of statutory interpreta-
tion at common law. Indeed, in all five points, one can see refer-
ences to the Mischief Rule, the Literal Rule and the Golden Rule, as
well as suggestions by the author that all three factors, cumula-
tively, may be taken into account in the process of statutory inter-
pretation.
Beside the acknowledgement that the classic rules are reiter-
ated and affirmed, it seems that very little else could be definitively
inferred from Driedger’s comments about the “modern principle”
and how courts should approach the construction of legislation. It
would be difficult, for instance, to identify something that suggests
in a meaningful way that the author favours a method that could be
associated clearly with “textualism” (also known as “literalism”)52,
which focuses on the plain meaning of the legislative text. On the
other hand, one would hardly be on firmer grounds to argue that
the quote constitutes an endorsement of “intentionalism” (also
known as “purposivism”)53, which focuses on the intention of Par-
liament as found through the panoply of interpretive arguments.
The confusion around what Driedger intended with his “modern
principle” and, in particular, whether it can be legitimately used to
support either of these methods might explain, at least in part, its
popularity with our courts.
B. A Survey of the Supreme Court of Canada Case Law
Looking at the decisions of the highest instance of the land, one
is struck by the inconsistency of methods associated with Driedger,
starting with the very first time the “modern principle” was invoked
in the Stubart case54. The interpretative issue revolved around sec-
tion 137 of the Income Tax Act55, which allowed tax reduction based
on losses carry-forward, and was resolved in favour of the taxpayer.
52 For a good summary of the “textualist” or “literalist” schools, see: W.N.
ESKRIDGE & P.P. FRICKEY, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning”,
(1990) 42 Stanford L. Rev. 321, 340ff.
53 For a good summary of the “intentionalist” or “purposivist” schools, see: id.,
325ff.
54 Supra, note 6.
55 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148.
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In his discussion on how to approach fiscal legislation, Estey J. wrote
the following:
Professor Willis, in his article, supra, accurately forecast the demise of
the strict interpretation rule for the construction of taxing statutes. Grad-
ually, the role of the tax statute in the community changed, as we have
seen, and the application of strict construction to it receded. Courts
today apply to this statute the plain meaning rule, but in a substantive
sense, so that if a taxpayer is within the spirit of the charge, he may be
held liable. See Whiteman and Wheatcroft, supra, at p. 37.
While not directing his observations exclusively to taxing statutes, the
learned author of Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87, E.A.
Dreidger [sic], put the modern rule succinctly: Today there is only one
principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoni-
ously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention
of Parliament.56
What Estey J. meant by “plain meaning in a substantive sense”
is unclear. Something is undisputable, however, namely the indica-
tion that strict construction has given way to purposive and con-
textual interpretation of legislation, be it fiscal or else. In spite of the
expression “plain meaning”, this approach is no doubt intentional-
ist57. Other references to Driedger in support of a non-textualist read-
ing of statutes are found later in Vachon v. Canada (Employment
and Immigration Commission)58, Canadian National v. Canada (Human
Rights Commission)59, Thomson v. Canada (Deputy Minister of Agri-
culture)60 and Symes v. Canada61.
It is in the same area of tax law that we witness a return to the
old restrictive plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation, some
56 Stubart, supra, note 6, 578 [emphasis added].
57 This is an opinion shared by R. SULLIVAN, loc. cit., note 11, 217. 
58 Supra, note 7, where at issue was section 49 of the Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. B-3. The reference to Driedger is at para. 48.
59 Supra, note 7, where the Court had to interpret the Canadian Human Rights Act,
S.C. 1976-77, c. 33. The reference to Driedger is at 1134.
60 Supra, note 7, where at issue was section 52(2) of the Canadian Security Intel-
ligence Service Act, S.C. 1984. The reference to Driedger is at 404, in the dis-
senting opinion of L’Heureux-Dubé J.
61 Supra, note 7, where at issue were provisions of Income Tax Act, supra, note 55,
providing for fiscal deductions for child care expenses. The reference to Driedger
is at 744.
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ten years later, in Canada v. Antosko62. In deciding whether a trans-
action came within the ambit of the tax deduction provided for at
section 20(14) of the Income Tax Act63, Iacobucci J. referred to the
key passage in the Construction of Statutes64 and to the opinion of
Estey J. in Stubart65, but added this:
This principle is determinative of the present dispute. While it is true that
the Courts must view discrete sections of the Income Tax Act in light of
the other provisions of the Act and of the purpose of the legislation, and
that they must analyze a given transaction in the context of economic
and commercial reality, such techniques cannot alter the result where
the words of the statute are clear and plain and where the legal and
practical effect of the transaction is undisputed: [cases omitted].66
It seems that the old plain meaning rule, and with it the strict
construction of fiscal legislation, have been brought back from their
shallow graves. But were they really born-again? Not really, it would
seem, if one considers the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada,
the same year, in Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-Dame
de Bon-Secours67. In this case, the following comments accompa-
nied Driedger: 
In light of this passage there is no longer any doubt that the interpreta-
tion of tax legislation should be subject to the ordinary rules of construc-
tion. 
[…]
The first consideration should therefore be to determine the purpose of
the legislation, whether as a whole or as expressed in a particular pro-
vision. 
[…]
The teleological approach makes it clear that in tax matters it is no longer
possible to reduce the rules of interpretation to presumptions in favour of
or against the taxpayer or to well-defined categories known to require a
liberal, strict or literal interpretation68. 
62 Supra, note 7.
63 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
64 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3.
65 Supra, note 6.
66 Canada v. Antosko, supra, note 7, 326 and 327. 
67 Supra, note 7.
68 Id., 15-17.
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These comments surely do not sound like textualist prose.
The oscillation between the two statutory interpretation meth-
ods, while references to Driedger remain constant, is confirmed in
later decisions. The 1995 case of Friesen v. Canada69, again in tax
law, saw Major J. clearly give a textual construction, after making
these observations: 
In interpreting sections of the Income Tax Act, the correct approach, as
set out by Estey J. in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 1
S.C.R. 537, is to apply the plain meaning rule. … The principle that the
plain meaning of the relevant sections of the Income Tax Act is to prevail
unless the transaction is a sham has recently been affirmed by this
Court [cases omitted]70. 
Chronologically, it is interesting to note however that in between
these two last cases, the Supreme Court handed down yet another
decision in taxation, Schwartz v. Canada71, in which this time an
intentionalist method was obviously favoured, with approving ref-
erences to Gonthier J. in Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp.
Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours72, himself using Driedger.
Beside fiscal law, there are many other areas in which contradict-
ing statements were made about the applicable interpretive method,
all relying however on the same passage of Construction of Statutes73.
In the criminal law case of R. v. McIntosh74, for instance, Lamer C.J.
most clearly used the old plain meaning rule but yet appeared to
endorse the “modern principle”, as expended through the five-step
analytical scheme also developed by Driedger75. Another example is
Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank76, in which the majority spoke of
the Bank Act’s77 plain meaning, yet resorted to Driedger’s famous
quote78; but as the minority opinion per L’Heureux-Dubé J. pointed
69 Supra, note 7.
70 Id., para. 10 and 11. Quoted in Alberta (Treasury Branches) v. M.N.R., supra,
note 7, 14.
71 Supra, note 7.
72 Supra, note 7.
73 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3. 
74 Supra, note 7, para. 21.
75 Supra, note 51 and accompanying text. 
76 Supra, note 7.
77 S.C. 1991, c. 46.
78 Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, supra, note 7, para. 22.
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out79, the method that all concerned adopted was encompassing
much more that the legislative text. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé her-
self, who was the main proponent of intentionalism during her ten-
ure at the Supreme Court of Canada, seems to have mistaken in
Régie des permis d’alcool80 when she associated Driedger with the
plain meaning rule, yet relied on the “modern principle” to describe
the applicable method in statutory interpretation.
It is in the unanimous decision of Rizzo Shoes81 that a second
breath was given to the method of construction that looks not only
at the legislative text, but at all evidence of the intention of Parlia-
ment. In discussing how to interpret statutes – here provisions of
Ontario Employment Standards Act82 – Iacobucci J. mentioned
authors in the discipline83 and opined thus: “Elmer Driedger in
Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the
approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory
interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation
alone”. Then came the usual reference to the second edition of the
work. This case was relied upon in many subsequent decisions,
along with the “modern principle” and sometimes along with the
applicable interpretation acts84, as authority for the proposition
that judges should go beyond legislative text and consider the object
and context of the statute at issue. These judgments include R. v.
Gladue85 (unanimous), Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychi-
79 Id., para. 6.
80 Supra, note 7, para. 152.
81 Supra, note 7.
82 R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.
83 These authors are Ruth SULLIVAN, with the 3rd edition of Driedger on the Con-
struction of Statutes, op. cit., note 10, and with her other book, Statutory Inter-
pretation, Concord, Ont., Irwin Law, 1997, as well as Pierre-André CÔTÉ, The
Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2nd ed., Cowansville, Éditions Yvon
Blais, 1991.
84 In Rizzo Shoes, supra, note 7, para. 22, Iacobucci J. cited section 10 of the
Ontario Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1980, to further support a broad and liberal
construction of the legislation under scrutiny. At the federal level, the relevant
provision is section 12 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21., which
provides: “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair,
large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attain-
ment of its objects”.
85 Supra, note 7, para. 25 and 26.
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atric Institute)86 (minority), Best v. Best87 (dissent), Winters v. Legal
Services Society88 (dissent), Francis v. Baker89 (unanimous), and R.
v. Davis90 (unanimous).
It took no more than a year after Rizzo Shoes91, however, for the
Supreme Court of Canada to revert to its internal division about
statutory interpretation and, along with it, the contradictory utili-
sation of the “modern principle”. Indeed, in the taxation case of
65302 British Colombia Ltd. v. Canada92, the association between
intentionalism and Driedger was found only in the minority judg-
ment93, while the majority returned to a discourse of textualism
after the usual borrowing from the Construction of Statutes94. The
swing-back of the pendulum was obvious when Iacobucci J. wrote:
“However, this Court has also often been cautious in utilizing tools
of statutory interpretation in order to stray from clear and unam-
biguous statutory language”95. The split decision, also dealing with
fiscal legislation, in Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada96
is another case on point. While, on the one hand, the dissent
resorted to Driedger as applied in Rizzo Shoes97 and stressed the
object and context of the enactment98, on the other hand, the major-
ity echoed the plain meaning rule and referred to Driedger and the
contradictory tax case law, holding that: “The primary rule of stat-
utory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of Parliament.
Where the meaning of the words used is plain and no ambiguity
arises from context, then the words offer the best indicator of Par-
liament’s intent”99.
86 Supra, note 7, para. 123.
87 Supra, note 7, para. 139.
88 Supra, note 7, para. 47.
89 Supra, note 7, para. 34.
90 Supra, note 7, para. 42.
91 Supra, note 7.
92 Supra, note 7.
93 Id., para. 5., per Bastarache J.
94 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3.
95 65302 British Colombia Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 7, para. 50.
96 Supra, note 7.
97 Supra, note 7.
98 Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada, supra, note 7, para. 32.
99 Id., para. 54.
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In the area of criminal law, the “modern principle” returned to
being utilised as the basis for a broad and liberal interpretation that
includes the text, but also the object and context of the statute, in
the unanimous decision of R. v. Araujo100. Again in criminal law,
same story in R. v. Sharpe101: “[Driedger] recognizes that statutory
interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation
alone102”. Such a non-textualist take on the “modern principle” was
also favoured in R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd.103 (fisheries), Ludco
Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada104 (taxation), Chieu v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration)105 (immigration) and Sarvanis v.
Canada106 (Crown liability).
The next significant judgment was Bell ExpressVu107, in which
a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada gave yet again confusing
signals. First, Iacobucci J. did the technical routine of referring to
Driedger and to the federal Interpretation Act108, as well as attempt-
ing a list of the case law that resorted to the “modern principle”109,
all pointing towards the intentionalist method. But then came the
discussion on ambiguity and how some interpretive arguments may
be employed only if there is such problems110, language that bor-
rows directly from the plain meaning rule and the textualist method.
In the end, however, this decision is one of those that went further
than the mere legislative text. Another interesting case is R. v.
Jarvis111, which relied on Driedger but reformulated his “modern
principle”, obviously in terms focussing equally on the text, object
and context of the enactment112.
100 Supra, note 7, para. 26.
101 Supra, note 7.
102 Id., para. 33.
103 Supra, note 7, para. 28.
104 Supra, note 7, para. 37. 
105 Supra, note 7, para. 27.
106 Supra, note 7, para. 24.
107 Supra, note 7.
108 Supra, note 84.
109 Bell ExpressVu, supra, note 7, para. 26.
110 Id., para. 28-30.
111 Supra, note 7, para. 77.
112 See infra, note 160 and accompanying text.
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As soon at the ink of that nice judicial pronouncement was dry
came another hard case that saw the Supreme Court of Canada split
on the construction of statutory language found in section 2 of the
Patent Act113 in the so-called “mouse case”, that is Harvard College114.
This time, however, the majority and the dissent did not disagree in
substance on the interpretive method advocated in the Construction
of Statutes115; both opinions stayed away from plain meaning argu-
ments and took into account a variety of interpretive elements116.
The justices just failed to reach the same conclusion at the end of
the day. A similar situation is found in Barrie Public Utilities v.
Canadian Cable Television Assn.117, where both the majority and
the dissent gave the same spin to the “modern principle”118. The
Driedger-intentionalist association also took place in Markevich v.
Canada119, C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)120, Parry Sound
(District) S.S.A.B. v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324121, United Taxi Drivers’ Fel-
lowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City)122, Alberta Union of Pro-
vincial Employees v. Lethbridge Community College123, Mosanto
Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)124, R.
v. Clark125 and Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid126.
113 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4.
114 Supra, note 7. This case is further discussed in Section II.B.2, infra, notes 181-
188 and accompanying text.
115 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3. 
116 The majority in Harvard College, supra, note 7, referred to Driedger and stated
the applicable method of statutory interpretation at para. 154, while the dissent
did the same at para. 11.
117 Supra, note 7.
118 The majority referred to Driedger’s citation in stating its approach to interpret-
ing s. 43(5) of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38. (see id., para. 20);
Bastarache J., in dissent, resorted to the key passage in discussing the proper
deference to give to the administrative board decision, an unprecedented use of
the “modern principle” (see id., para. 86).
119 Supra, note 7, para. 12.
120 Supra, note 7, para. 106.
121 Supra, note 7, para. 41.
122 Supra, note 7, para. 8.
123 Supra, note 7, para. 25.
124 Supra, note 7, para. 19.
125 Supra, note 7, para. 43.
126 Supra, note 7, para. 80.
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More recently, it is in constitutional interpretation and in consti-
tutional challenges under the Charter127 that the “modern principle”
was translated into a broad and liberal method to read statutes, one
which encompasses text, object and context. It was the case in R. v.
Blais128 and Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re)129.
In this area as in all the others, however, the spectres of the plain
meaning rule and, with it, the preliminary requirement of ambigu-
ity that conditions the use of all available interpretative arguments,
are never far away. In R. v. Clay130, for instance, the majority reverted
to the spirit of textualim when, with Driedger’s citation, Iacobucci J.
referred to his statement in Bell ExpressVu131 and categorically held
that: “Here there is no ambiguity”132. The process of interpreting
the legislative regime of the Narcotic Control Act133 was then cut
short, examining only the language used in the relevant provisions.
Just last December, the lack of legislative ambiguity was the justi-
fication to reject Charter134 values as an interpretative tool in Char-
lebois v. Saint John (City)135, dealing with the quasi-constitutional
enactment that is New Brunswick Official Languages Act136. Driedger
was invoked,137 but so was Iacobucci J. in Bell ExpressVu138, which
was relied upon by Charron J. for her comment in fine: “Absent any
remaining ambiguity, Charter values have no role to play”139.
The whole struggle between plain meaning and intentionalism,
with or without the preliminary requirement of ambiguity, is still
very much ongoing, as the latest decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada on intellectual property testifies. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
127 Supra, note 16.
128 Supra, note 7, para. 16.
129 Supra, note 7, para. 34.
130 Supra, note 7.
131 Supra, note 7.
132 R. v. Clay, supra, note 7, para. 56.
133 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1.
134 Supra, note 16.
135 Supra, note 7, in the reasons for the majority of 5 (4 justices dissenting) per
Charron J.
136 Supra, note 20.
137 Charlebois v. Saint John (City), supra, note 7, para. 10.
138 Supra, note 7, para. 62.
139 Charlebois v. Saint John (City), supra, note 7, para. 24.
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v. Canada (Attorney General)140, Binnie J. for the majority construed
the legislation having regard to all the interpretative elements sug-
gested by Driedger. On the other hand, although wrapping himself
with the “modern principle” cloth and invoking context and purpose,
the dissent per Bastarache J. warned that: “Contextual interpreta-
tion does not justify departures from ordinary rules of statutory
interpretation; in particular, reading in words cannot be justified in
the absence of a demonstrable ambiguity”141. If it is one, the con-
solation seems to reside in the apparent common willingness, always,
to adopt a progressive method of construction, which Driedger’s
would epitomise.
This tango is certainly bound to continue unabated, however,
especially given that the people on our highest court are not even
coherent in the interpretative method they individually favour. Wit-
ness how just months after the later case the same Binnie J., this
time dissenting in Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc.142, was
rebuked by the majority: “Although he claims to follow the modern
approach to the interpretation of legislative provisions, Binnie J.
actually relies on the literal interpretation”143. Which he did indeed,
unashamedly speaking simultaneously of “modern principle” and
legislative ambiguity, holding solemnly and in all seriousness that
“the legislators intended what they said”144. A few weeks yet and
Binnie J. reverted back to a broad and liberal method of construc-
tion in Merk v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Orna-
mental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 771145, where for the
majority he recalled Driedger and, without any allusion to ambigu-
ity, considered fully the text, context and purpose of the labour leg-
islation at issue.
II. The Legacy of the “Modern Principle” in Canada
The continuing want of uniformity in methods does not affect in
any way a basic undeniable observation, namely that the “modern
140 Supra, note 7.
141 Id., para. 103.
142 Id., para. 13.
143 Id., para. 13.
144 Id., para. 115.
145 Supra, note 7.
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principle” is THE approach to statutory interpretation adopted at
the Supreme Court of Canada and, following its lead, in the other
superior courts of this country. This being so, the time has certainly
come to assess the impact Driedger really has had on the work of
our highest court. Sure, words such as “modern”, “contextual” or
“purposive” suggest sophistication. But is this terminology more
than a clever repackaging of traditional ways of doing things?
The answer to this question is made difficult because the prin-
cipal functions that Canadian courts discharge on a daily basis are
fundamentally ambiguous. Driedger’s principle, as it appears in the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, may be viewed as the
expression of the method that is, in fact, followed by the judiciary in
reaching a decision on a question of statutory interpretation. Or it
may be viewed as providing courts with a framework for the justi-
fication of an interpretive decision. Or, again, it may be viewed both
as an indication of a recommended method for reaching a decision
and as providing a framework for the judicial justification of that
decision.
Accordingly, the main functions courts fulfill when interpreting
legislation must be examined (Section A), before assessing the
impact of Driedger’s “modern principle” on the methodology of con-
struction (Section B).
A. The Functions of the “Modern Principle”
When a court is faced with a question of statutory construction,
it will normally come across the principles that have been developed
over centuries concerning the goals of interpretation, the factors
that are to be considered in interpreting enactments and the vari-
ous presumptions which may influence the decision and its justifi-
cation. The task of the judiciary can be analysed as consisting, first,
in choosing between opposite meanings, thus selecting the one that
represents the “true meaning” of an enactment, or its “best” or “pref-
erable meaning”. This decision having been made, a second process
then begins, namely the process of justifying the interpretation in a
written opinion146. Principles of statutory interpretation play a role
146 On this distinction, see: Robert S. SUMMERS, “On Method and Methodology”,
in D. Neil MacCORMICK and Robert S. SUMMERS (eds.), Interpreting Statutes:
A Comparative Study, Brookfield, Dartmouth Publishing, 9, at 16-18 (1991).
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at both the meaning-selection phase and the meaning-justification
phase of the process147.
At the meaning-selection stage, the judge hears submissions
from the parties, submissions that are in large part based on prin-
ciples of interpretation. Those principles determine the goal or goals
of the interpretive process as well as the legitimate means to pursue
these goals, i.e. what factors should be considered and, in cases of
doubt, what solutions are presumptively preferable. Having in mind
these conflicting submissions – referring to legislative intent, ordi-
nary meaning, context, purpose, history, consequences, authorities,
presumptions, and so on – the judge then decides which meaning
should be favoured.
Once that decision is made, an entirely different process begins,
that of justifying the interpretation, generally in a written opinion.
This stage is anything but a simple narration of the mental process
by which the judge arrived at his or her interpretive decision. The goal
is not to describe but to justify. Whereas the meaning-selection stage
ends with a decision as to the appropriate meaning, the meaning-
justification stage starts with that interpretation and aims at dem-
onstrating that it is preferable to any other. And while at the meaning-
selection stage, the judge considers all the valid reasons that may
be relevant to the choice at hand, at the meaning-justification stage,
the practice in Canadian courts is generally to highlight only those
reasons which support the judge’s choice of meaning. The reasons
that run against this choice are either not mentioned or summarily
discounted. It is noteworthy, finally, that the meaning-selection stage
involves indeed a private intellectual process, one taking place in
the secrecy of the judge’s mind, whereas the meaning-justification
stage involves a public intellectual process, which constitutes an
“authoritative public justification of interpretational decisions”148.
147 On the distinction between the heuristic and the rhetorical functions of the
principles of statutory interpretation, see: Pierre-André CÔTÉ, The Interpreta-
tion of Legislation in Canada, 3rd ed., Toronto, Carswell, 2000, at 37-41.
148 R.S. SUMMERS, loc. cit., note 146, 18.
11-Revue.book  Page 155  Jeudi, 8. juin 2006  3:25 15
(2006) 40 R.J.T. 131156
1. Driedger Meant Meaning-Selection 
or Meaning-Justification?
When a judge uses the word “interpretation” or “construction”,
it is often unclear whether he or she is referring to the process of
assigning meaning to a legislative text or to the subsequent activity
of justifying that meaning in a written opinion. Although “interpre-
tation” and “construction” suggest the ascertainment of a legal rule
taking the enactment as a starting point, they are sometimes used
to refer to the justification of the selected meaning.
A good illustration of this dual utilisation of “interpretation” or
“construction” is found in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Ska-
pinker149. This is the first decision by the Supreme Court of Canada
dealing with the interpretation of the Charter150. In the course of
arguments, the parties had referred the Court to historical material
retracing, in particular, the parliamentary discussions surrounding
the adoption of section 6 of the Charter and those documents were
accepted. Presumably, the Court had considered them in arriving
at its decision, but it preferred not to make use of this extrinsic evi-
dence in justifying its conclusion. This is how Estey J. explained the
Court’s position:
The Court on this appeal received this historical material. I have not
found it necessary to take recourse to it in construing s. 6, and therefore,
I do not wish to be taken in this appeal as determining, one way or the
other, the propriety in the constitutional interpretive process of the
admission of such material to the record.
It seems clear from the context that the word “construing” is
used here to refer to the process of justification of an interpretation
in a written opinion rather than to the process of determining the
true or best meaning of an enactment.
Going back to Driedger’s “modern principle”, is it to be under-
stood as indicating the proper approach to the determination of the
true meaning of legislative texts or is it addressing the issue of the
appropriate way to justify conclusions on matters of statutory inter-
pretation? Is it a narrative directed at all interpreters of statutes,
including the courts, containing the preferred approach to interpret
149 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.
150 Supra, note 16.
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acts or is it a narrative speaking to a much smaller audience, made
up only of the members of the judiciary, containing the preferred
way of justifying an interpretive decision?
If one considers Driedger’s own expression of the “modern prin-
ciple” examined in Section I.A, it is absolutely clear that it was
meant to deal with the ascertainment of meaning, not justification.
It was published in a legal manual and echoed the author’s lectures
at the University of Ottawa. In no way is it addressed to judges or
does it deal with the drafting of interpretive decisions. Moreover, sug-
gesting that the three traditional “Rules” (Mischief Rule, Literal Rule,
Golden Rule) were not in themselves real rules, but were simply three
interpretative tools always available in ascertaining the meaning of
enactments was not a new proposition when The Construction of
Statutes was published in 1974, even less so at the time of the sec-
ond edition in 1983. As early as 1938, John Willis can be credited of
the idea, which is found at the very first page of his classic Statute
Interpretation in a Nutshell, an article clearly dealing with interpre-
tation in the usual sense, i.e. the ascertainment of meaning in an
enactment151.
2. Using Driedger More for Meaning-Selection 
or Meaning-Justification?
While the function of the “modern principle” was unambiguous
under Driedger’s pen, the same can hardly be said since it has been
borrowed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The survey of the case
law in Section I.B, we submit, reasonably supports the argument
that Driedger’s quote is presented by the Court as a principle for
meaning-selection while it is utilised by the Court as a framework
for meaning-justification. The Court is thus addressing simultane-
ously, on the one hand, all interpreters by advocating a general
151 John WILLIS, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell”, (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1,
at 1: “Look closer and you will see that there is not one single approach, but
three; (i) ‘the literal rule’, (ii) ‘the golden rule’, (iii) ‘the mischief rule’. Any one of
theses approaches may be selected by your court : which it does decide to select
may, in a close case, be the determining element in the decision. Your guess
should therefore be based on an application of all three approaches: you should
not be misled by Craies or Maxwell into thinking there is only one to consider”
[footnotes omitted]. See also, to the same effect: THE LAW COMMISSION AND
THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, Report on the Interpretation of Statutes,
London, H.M.S.O., 1969, at 17. 
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approach to the actual finding of legislative meaning and, on the
other hand, the members of the judiciary by indicating the pre-
ferred way of drafting judgments dealing with statutory interpreta-
tion.
Given that the ordinary sense of “interpretation” or “construc-
tion” refers to the process of ascertaining the meaning of a text, it is
reasonable to think that the function the Supreme Court of Canada
wants to give to the “modern principle” is to indicate what is, in its
view, the “preferred”, “established”, “proper”, “prevailing”, “appro-
priate” approach to meaning-selection152. But often, Driedger’s quote
also seems to provide the Court with a standardized outline or frame-
work for drafting judgments involving questions statutory interpre-
tation. The fact of the matter is that expressions taken straight from
the excerpt at hand – such as “grammatical and ordinary sense”,
“context”, “scheme of the Act” and “object of the Act” – appear in a
good number of opinions as headings that structure the Court’s
justification of the meaning it has selected153.
What speaks loud and clear about this point is that the Supreme
Court of Canada, on more than one occasion, has felt it necessary
to mention that one needs not consider slavishly all the elements
suggested in Driedger’s formulation of the “modern principle”. In
Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), for instance,
Iacobucci J. writes:
While the interpretive factors enumerated by Driedger need not be
applied in a formulaic fashion, they provide a useful framework through
which to approach this appeal, given that the sole issue is one of statu-
tory interpretation. However, I note that these interpretive factors are
152 For example, see the numerous “professions of faith” by the Supreme Court of
Canada highlighted above, supra, notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
153 One of the most striking illustrations is Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Super-
intendent of Financial Services), supra, note 7, where Deschamps J., after citing
Driedger, writes, at para. 19: “I will examine each of these factors in turn, first
with the background context”. The opinion then contains the following head-
ings: “A. Historical Context”; “B. Grammatical and Ordinary Sense”; “C. Scheme
of the Act”; and “D. Object of the Act”. Similarly, see: Merk v. International Asso-
ciation of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local
771, supra, note 7, para. 18, and the headings that follow, as well as R. v. C.D.,
supra, note 7, para. 27, and the headings that follow.
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closely related and interdependent. They therefore need not be can-
vassed separately in every case.154
It is reasonable to argue that this last remark concerns the draft-
ing of judgments, not interpretation proper. As a caveat, it is rather
useless if it is directed at interpreters of legislation in general, but it
becomes crucial when it is addressed to judges, telling them they
need not refer in all cases to each and every element enumerated in
the “modern principle”. There are at least three good reasons for
this. First, following too closely Driedger’s formulation in judgment
drafting would lead to repetitious opinions. For example, once a
judge has examined the ordinary meaning, the object of the Act, its
scheme and its context, there is not much use for a further discus-
sion of the intention of Parliament. Second, reference to a given ele-
ment, say the object of the act, may be of some help in a majority of
cases, but not in all cases. Finally, and most importantly, from a
rhetorical perspective, it may not be advisable to canvas the “gram-
matical and ordinary sense” of a word, for example, if the court has
decided that this element should give way to other interpretive
arguments155.
3. Legitimizing Interpretation with the “Modern 
Principle”
If the “modern principle” prescribes a general approach to ques-
tions of statutory interpretation while at the same time providing
the courts with a framework for the justification of interpretive deci-
sions, one might ask which one of these two functions is the dom-
inant one. In our view, Driedger’s quote is overwhelmingly used for
the purpose of justifying interpretive decisions, which in turn is
done in an attempt to legitimize the courts role in that regard. Its
meaning-selection function is but a secondary one.
154 Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, note 7, para. 28.
To the same effect, see: Bell ExpressVu, supra, note 7, para. 31; Alberta Union of
Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge Community College, supra, note 7, para. 27;
Marche v. Halifax Insurance Co., supra, note 7, para. 55; Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 7, para. 96; H.L. v. Canada (Attor-
ney General), supra, note 7, para. 187.
155 In cases where the Court feels that the ordinary meaning should not be deter-
minative, either the “modern principle” is not mentioned at all (see: R. v. Money,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 652) or the “grammatical and ordinary sense” is not discussed
(see: Rizzo Shoes, supra, note 7).
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One piece of evidence is how the Supreme Court of Canada has
continued to refer to Driedger’s second edition of The Construction
of Statutes even though professor Ruth Sullivan, in the third edition
of the book, expressed the contemporary methodology in a way which
reflects the current interpretive practice much better than the ide-
alized conception embodied in the original version of the “modern
principle,” favoured by the Court156. Why does it prefer a less real-
istic description of how legislative meaning is and should be deter-
mined157? The answer seems to be that, even though the first
formulation of the “modern principle” is inferior to Ruth Sullivan’s
reformulation, as a description of the actual interpretive practice of
Canadian legal actors (especially judges), it is considered superior
by the Supreme Court of Canada because it is more convenient in
terms of justification and, more importantly, in terms of legitimiza-
tion of the judicial interpretive decisions. Having a choice between
candour and legitimacy, the Court has clearly opted for the lat-
ter158.
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s conception of the proper role of a
judge in construing statutes reflects the traditional view, namely
that the one and only objective of legislative interpretation is the
ascertainment of the legislative will. Driedger’s “modern principle”,
accordingly, would rest on a theory of construction based on the
original intention of Parliament. Whereas in the realm of the com-
mon law (i.e. judge-made-law), courts see themselves as responsi-
156 R. SULLIVAN, op. cit., note 10, at 131 and 132: 
There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to
determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the
purpose of legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the pre-
sumptions and special rules of interpretation, as well as admissible external
aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all relevant
and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account,
the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate
interpretation is one that can be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its
compliance with the legislative text; (b) its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the
legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the outcome is reasonable
and just. 
157 Professor Sullivan’s 3rd edition of The Construction of Statutes has been cited
but a few times, only in dissenting opinions and mostly by L’Heureux-Dubé J.
See supra, note 9.
158 On the possible conflict between legitimacy and candour in statutory interpre-
tation, see: N.S. ZEPPOS, “Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation”, 78
Georgetown L.J. 353 (1989-1990).
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ble for the evolution and adaptation of legal norms, when it comes
to statute law, their role is presented as being much more limited.
Since “[s]tatutory enactments embody legislative will”, Iacobucci J.
wrote in Bell ExpressVu, “when a statute comes into play during
judicial proceedings, [the courts] are charged with interpreting and
applying it in accordance with the sovereign intent of the legisla-
tor”159. 
In R. v. Jarvis, the “modern principle” has thus been rephrased
in order to embody this quite narrow view of the nature of the inter-
pretive task of courts: 
The approach to statutory interpretation can be easily stated: one is to
seek the intention of Parliament by reading the words of the provision in
context and according to their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmo-
niously with the scheme and object of the statute.160
In adopting a conception of interpretation which is limited to the
discovery of a meaning which is already there, imbedded in the text,
the Court undoubtedly seeks to project an image of judicial restraint
and neutrality in the face of the sovereign will of the legislator.
Driedger’s formulation is perfectly suited for this purpose; Sullivan’s
reformulation is not. Professor Sullivan, rightly so, writes that the
interpreter should be mindful of the consequences of the proposed
interpretation and suggests that the question of whether or not a
given interpretation produces a just and reasonable outcome is as
legitimate as the inquiry into the collective mind of the Parliament.
It is certainly felt, quite unfortunately, that such interpretative
arguments should not be explicitly endorsed by courts.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s insistence on sticking with the
second edition of The Construction of Statutes can thus be consid-
ered as a manifestation of a certain kind of rhetorical caution. It is
surely not pure coincidence that 1984 is the year the Court referred
to Driedger’s treatise for the first time (in the Stubart161 case) as well
as the year of the first Charter162 interpretation case (Law Society of
Upper Canada v. Skapinker163). With respect to the Charter, the
159 Bell ExpressVu, supra, note 7, para. 61-62.
160 R. v. Jarvis, supra, note 7, para. 77.
161 Supra, note 6.
162 Supra, note 16.
163 Supra, note 149.
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Court has not even tried to conceal the fact that it was entrusted
with a mandate involving difficult and important policy choices and
it has not shied away from that responsibility. With regard to non-
constitutional enactments, however, 1984 marks the beginning of
an era of apparent judicial restraint, as if it wanted to downplay the
importance of the policy-making role it has to assume, inevitably,
when it construes such ordinary legislation.
To the question “What is the function of the ‘modern principle’
as it is used by the Supreme Court of Canada?”, the answer is that
it prescribes a general approach to issues of statutory interpreta-
tion, while at the same time providing the courts with a framework
for drafting opinions justifying interpretive decisions. Of the two
functions, the rhetorical one dominates the heuristic one because
Driedger’s quote creates the net impression that statutory interpre-
tation implies simply the discovery or declaration of something
which is already there, that the solution owes nothing to the court’s
policy choices and is entirely determined by the intention of Parlia-
ment.
Now that the functions on the “modern principle” have been
identified, the paper examines if Driedger’s doctrine has meant
progress for the law of statutory interpretation, as laid down by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
B. The Impact of the “Modern Principle”
The “modern principle” has now been the Supreme Court of
Canada’s preferred approach to statutory interpretation for over
20 years and it seems appropriate at this point to attempt an assess-
ment of its contribution to the evolution of the law of this country.
The principle has certainly brought about some changes for the bet-
ter, but it is riddled with so many difficulties that it is justified to
ask whether the price for progress has been worth it. These prob-
lems relate both to form and to substance.
1. Form
Some difficulties with the actual terms “modern principle”, coined
by Driedger, stem from the fact that they have been divorced from
their context, thereby altering their meaning significantly. Other
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problems are linked to the author’s choice of words. For the sake of
convenience, here is again the famous quote:
THE MODERN PRINCIPLE
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an
Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament.164
The expression “modern principle”, when taken out of the con-
text of utterance, can be misleading. As it was pointed out in Sec-
tion I.A, one should bear in mind that in his book, Driedger
contrasts the method he is promoting with the Mischief Rule (for-
mulated in the sixteenth century) as well as the Literal Rule and
Golden Rule (from the nineteenth century). The term “modern” in
this context should be understood in a relative sense, and we are
quite confident that an early twentieth century judge could easily
have subscribed to Driedger’s formulation. Indeed, one of the author-
ities cited in support of the “modern principle” is a 1921 judgement
of the Privy Council165.
Out-of-context use of the term “modern” by the Court might
suggest that the method in question corresponds to contemporary
notions of interpretation, but this is not the case. Rather, the approach
at hand is entirely traditional and, given its basic flaws, would find
but lukewarm support in legal circles, particularly in academe166.
Justice Gonthier was undoubtedly right in Lavigne v. Canada (Office
of the Commissioner of Official Languages) when he wrote that
Driedger’s method was the “traditional approach to the interpreta-
tion of legislation”167.
Furthermore, the words “there is only one principle or approach”,
when taken out of context, suggest that the “modern principle”, in
and by itself, says all that needs to be said about the appropriate
approach to the interpretation of statutes. Again, this is the result
of taking the author’s words out of their original context. When
Driedger writes that “there is only one principle or approach”, he
164 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3.
165 Victoria City v. Bishop of Vancouver Island, supra, note 48.
166 See, for instance: R. SULLIVAN, loc. cit., note 11.
167 Supra, note 7, para. 25 [emphasis added].
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means simply that there is one approach as opposed to three
approaches (corresponding to the Literal Rule, Mischief Rule, Golden
Rule). As mentioned in Section I.A, the three so-called “Rules” are to
be fused into only one single approach combining the elements of
these three traditional ideas. It does not follow that Driedger can be
said to mean that this approach encompasses all that needs to be
said about the appropriate way to interpret statutes. In fact, his
less-than-half-a-page “modern principle” at the end of a seven-page
chapter in a treatise that counts 249 pages cannot be the whole
story. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the words written by
the man who insisted so much on the importance of a contextual
approach have themselves been taken out of context and given a
meaning that is materially different than intended!
Other problems result from the manner in which the “modern
principle” has been formulated. It is not surprising, as seen in Sec-
tion II.A.3, that Major and Iacobucci JJ. opted to reword it in R. v.
Jarvis168. Driedger’s formulation is repetitive, if not redundant. It
wrongly places the intention of Parliament, which pertains to the
goals of construction, on the same plane as the meaning of words,
the scheme of the act and its objects, all of which refer to the means
by which such an intent is determined. Furthermore, Driedger’s
text suggests that a legislative interpretation is admissible only if it
meets all of the proposed elements which are: (i) the ordinary sense;
(ii) the scheme of the act; (iii) the object of the act; and (iv) the inten-
tion of Parliament. In reality, the first three are not criteria that all
have to be met in the process of interpretation, but are only factors
that may be considered in ascertaining intention. Ordinary sense
must have to be discarded, for instance, in order to achieve the object
of an act or to ensure its internal consistency. 
All in all, these shortcomings are of fairly minor significance, as
they pertain only to issues of form. However, Driedger’s “modern
principle” may be the subject of more fundamental criticisms, with
respect to its substance.
2. Substance
There has certainly been progress made in Canadian statutory
interpretation that has resulted at least in part from the promotion
168 Supra, note 7, para. 77.
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of the “modern principle”. To start with, Driedger’s formulation places
greater emphasis on the idea that the meaning of an act does not
result solely from the conventional or usual meanings of its words.
In Rizzo Shoes, Iacobucci J. opined along these lines and wrote:
“[S]tatutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the
legislation alone”169. Similarly, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. expressed
this concern in Macdonell v. Quebec (Commission d’accès à l’infor-
mation)170. As the case law survey in Section I.B demonstrated, how-
ever, it is difficult to reconcile such statements with those found in
other decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada, reminiscent of the
plain meaning rule171.
A second positive consequence of Driedger’s writings is worth
noting, namely that the “modern principle” encourages the consid-
eration of the legislative object as a factor in interpretation. This
idea is not new though. Indeed back in 1849, the Interpretation Act
of the Province of Canada already contained a reference to the object
of an act172, as would all subsequent interpretation acts. Having
said that, it is only with the consecration of the “modern principle”
that the consideration of the object, be it of the act as a whole or of
the particular provision at issue, has become standard procedure
in Canadian courts’ process of construction173.
On the other hand, what the Supreme Court of Canada has
made of Driedger’s quote is problematic from a substantive stand-
point, in terms of both meaning-selection and meaning-justification.
As the expression of a method of construction, the difficulty with
the “modern principle” is not what it says, but rather what it fails to
say. It provides what is in effect a gross over-simplification of a
complex process, whether one considers the goals or the means of
statutory interpretation.
169 Rizzo Shoes, supra, note 7, para. 21.
170 Supra, note 7, para. 67: “[T]he interpretation of an Act cannot be based simply
on its wording”.
171 As Ruth Sullivan wrote in the fourth edition of The Construction of Statutes, the
plain meaning rule is totally inconsistent with the “modern principle”, which
requires a consideration of context in all cases. See: Ruth SULLIVAN, Sullivan
and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed., Toronto, Butterworths,
2002, at 9.
172 (1849) 12-13 Vict. C. 10, s. 5(28).
173 See: Ruth SULLIVAN, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell”, (2003) 82
Can. Bar Rev. 51, 54 and 55.
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According to what Driedger is deemed to say, the one and only
goal of statutory interpretation recognised by the Supreme Court of
Canada is the ascertainment of the intention of Parliament174. While
there is no denying the central role of this construct in statutory
interpretation175, fidelity to legislative intent is very far from being
the one and only value involved in the determination of meaning in
statutory texts. Many factors regularly considered by interpreters
could not be rationally justified if legislative intent were the only
goal. It is so for arguments based on authorities, especially judicial
cases interpreting a given provision: they were not known to the leg-
islator and cannot be said to reveal in any way its intention. The rel-
evance of previous interpretive decisions rests on considerations of
fairness, predictability and stability of the law, rather than fidelity
to legislative intent. A recent case showing the multifaceted goals in
construction is R. v. Daoust176, where the Supreme Court of Canada
rejected an interpretation which, in its opinion, would represent the
intention of Parliament because that will was not reflected in the
linguistic version of a criminal statute corresponding to the lan-
guage of the accused. Here again, considerations of fairness and
predictability trumped the search for legislative intent.
As for the means by which the goals of statutory interpretation
can be reached, the “modern principle” singles out four of them:
(i) the “entire context”, (ii) the “grammatical and ordinary sense” of
words, (iii) the “scheme of the act” and (iv) the “object of the act”.
Again, these elements are no doubt important in the interpretive
process, but this list leaves out many other material aspects, some
of which are fundamental. Presumptions of intent, which abound in
statutory construction, are not mentioned; neither are authorities,
or cases in particular, which any experienced legal practitioner will
normally consider and research before arguing a file involving stat-
utes. Also, principles requiring a “fair, large and liberal construc-
tion” or, conversely, calling for a “strict construction” are ignored in
the quote. The consequences of a proposed interpretation are con-
spicuously absent from Driedger’s outline, even though case law
174 R. v. Jarvis, supra, note 7, para. 77, cited in Épiciers Unis Métro-Richelieu v. Col-
lin, supra, note 7, para. 21.
175 L.M. SOLAN, “Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative
Intent in Statutory Interpretation”, March 2004 [http://ssrn.com/abstract=
515022].
176 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217.
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shows that adjudicators are not indifferent to the practical results
that flow from the interpretation of statutes177. Finally, there is no
mention of policy considerations, so crucial at the Supreme Court
of Canada.
These shortcomings will obviously affect not only the meaning-
selection phase of the judicial interpretive process, but also the
meaning-justification phase. Reasons for judgment based on the
context, the ordinary sense, the scheme or objects of the act are
undoubtedly legitimate and they can be convincing, but many other
reasons, as legitimate and potentially convincing, are left out. If the
Supreme Court of Canada wishes to refer to them, it has to do so
outside the framework propounded by Driedger. It is the situation
for arguments based on authorities such as judicial decisions, as
well as for presumptions of intent; more importantly, it is the situ-
ation for policy considerations, including those pertaining to the
practical consequences of rival interpretations178.
The truth of the matter is that the fundamental flaw with the
“modern principle” is the theory of interpretation on which it is
grounded, a theory centred around the original intention of Parlia-
ment. Interpretation is deemed to be all about finding something
which is “already there”, that is the legislative intent. What was once
said about theories in human activities by professor Henry Mintzberg
may be apposite to recall here, namely that one should not ask
whether or not such theories are true, but rather whether or not
they are useful179. The history of science teaches us that an out-
moded theory that has been proved inaccurate may still continue to
be used for some specific purposes if it provides good service. The
theory of “universal relativity”, for example, has supplanted Newton’s
laws of physics, but scientists continue to refer to these laws in cer-
tain circumstances, because they maintain their usefulness.
Professor Mintzberg illustrates his point with what he calls the
“flat earth theory”. For a long time this theory, obsolete for genera-
tions now, was the basis of the human understanding of the world.
177 P.-A. CÔTÉ, op. cit., note 147, at 443ff. It is interesting to note that the Nova
Scotia Interpretation Act not only allows for consideration of the consequences of
an interpretation but actually requires it: R.S.N.S, c. 235, par. 9(5)f.
178 See: Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U.,
Local 324, supra note 7, para. 50-54.
179 See interview in La Presse daily newspaper, April 23, 1999, C1.
11-Revue.book  Page 167  Jeudi, 8. juin 2006  3:25 15
(2006) 40 R.J.T. 131168
However, the “flat earth theory” maintains its utility and has in a
sense survived to this day. Consider a flight from Montreal to Lon-
don. The pilot must plan such a flight based on a conception of the
earth that is round, otherwise the aircraft would end up in outer
space. However, during a landing at Heathrow, the overly compli-
cated “round earth theory” is of no use. The pilot will have an easier
time landing if he or she thinks in terms of a flat earth.
The theory of construction based on the original intention of
Parliament that forms the basis of Driedger’s “modern principle” is
to interpretation, we argue, what the “flat earth theory” is to avia-
tion in Mintzberg’s example. It is an outdated conception that fails
to do justice to the complexity of the process of legislative interpre-
tation. Yet the reasoning has remained because, in spite of its faults,
it is still extremely useful. First, it may serve as a suitable interpre-
tive strategy for the simpler cases, which indeed dominate the daily
construction of legislation. If one tries to determine the intent of a
lawmaker by assessing the ordinary sense of words and their mean-
ing in context, particularly with respect to other provisions of the
law and its objects, one arrives most of the time at the best mean-
ing.
Second, the notion of Parliament’s original intent may serve
judges as the basis for justifying their interpretive choices, thereby
making their decisions appear to be mere mirrors of the will of the
elected assembly. Pursuant to the traditional theory, the judge sim-
ply assumes the role of “the mouth that pronounces the words of
the law”, to quote Montesquieu180. The “modern principle” lets
judges attribute to Parliament the solution they select, which fur-
thers the impression that judicial decision-making and justice are
impersonal. However, the theory appears less practical in hard cases,
those that judges may encounter all the more often. Such cases
involve circumstances in which the law is ambiguous or is vague,
those involving under- or over-inclusive provisions, those in which
the text is to be applied to circumstances that were not anticipated
at the time it was drafted, and those into which some errors seem to
have slipped.
180 Taken from his classis work, C.-L. de S. MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des loix,
London, n.b., 1757.
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Harvard College181 clearly illustrates the difficulties associated
with applying the “modern principle” to hard cases. The Supreme
Court of Canada handed down a ruling on the possibility of patent-
ing a mouse that was genetically modified for the purpose of cancer
research. The Court had to decide if the terms “manufacture” or
“composition of matter” used in section 2 of the Patent Act182 could
be interpreted as designating a transgenic mouse and, more gener-
ally, higher forms of life obtained through genetic manipulation. This
issue was quite controversial and the case proved to be extremely
difficult, as illustrated by the division in opinion among the judges
who ruled on the matter at the federal courts and at the Supreme
Court of Canada183.
Justice Bastarache wrote for the majority, which ruled against
awarding the patent. He chose to set his reasons within the frame-
work of the “modern principle”184 and the traditional theory of inter-
pretation. In his reasons, there were 36 references to the intent or
will of Parliament. Two difficulties arise out of the reliance on Driedger.
To begin with, the essence of the majority’s opinion boils down to
highlighting different kinds of difficulties (ethical, environmental,
social, economic) that would result from the decision supporting
the patentability of the transgenic mouse and, more generally, of
higher forms of life185. These arguments are classic; they used to be
captured in the Latin phrase “ab inconvenienti”. These factors con-
cern the problems brought about by the interpretation the judge
wishes to avoid.
Now, where do such arguments fit within the framework set out
by the “modern principle”? Recall, once more, the formulation: “[…]
the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context in their gram-
matical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament”186. There
is simply no place in this formulation for consequential arguments
or policy considerations. Lacking a better solution, Bastarache J.
181 Supra, note 7.
182 Supra, note 113.
183 A total of thirteen judges ruled on this matter; seven were opposed to awarding
a patent, six were in favour.
184 Harvard College, supra, note 7, para. 154.
185 Id., para. 167-183.
186 E.A. DRIEDGER, op. cit., note 3, at 87.
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grouped them under the heading “The Scheme of the Act”. However,
the expression does not really refer to the consequences of legisla-
tive interpretation. Rather, the “scheme” relates to the manner in
which different portions of an act interact; this is what dictionary def-
initions, as well as Driedger himself187, explain. Accordingly, Har-
vard College illustrates how the “modern principle” does not do justice
to the Canadian interpretative practice, a practice that recognizes a
major role to choices in construction and to the actual consequences
of interpretation.
Reference to the intention of Parliament in this case raises
another difficulty. The majority stated that the many problems posed
by awarding patents for higher forms of life suggest that lawmakers
had not intended for patents to be awarded in this manner. This
point188 actually gives pause for thought when one considers that
the definition of the word “invention” in the Patent Act essentially
dates back to 1869, a time at which no one could have anticipated
the development of genetic engineering, let alone the wide range of
difficulties that would be posed by such technological progress.
Invoking the original will of Parliament in this situation is not totally
convincing, to say the least.
In reality, although Bastarache J. for the majority of the Court
said he was trying to determine legislative intent, in yielding to the
traditional rhetoric, he actually (and quite legitimately, one should
add) appeared to be seeking a satisfactory response to the issue of
patentability of higher forms of life. Such a response certainly ought
to take into account the text of the act, its scheme and its objects.
However, it should also give a lot of weight to the practical conse-
quences flowing from the selected solution, with respect to certain
social goals such as insuring human dignity, encouraging scientific
research, fostering Canada’s competitive role in this field, and pro-
tecting the environment. The decision in Harvard College, which was
essentially guided by policy considerations, is presented as if it
could have been directly taken from the text of the act and inferred
from the intention of Parliament. This approach represents an unfor-
187 Id., at 3: “[T]he relation of the various provisions of a statute to each other”.
188 It is particularly evident in the majority’s reasons in Harvard College, supra,
note 7, para. 167: “In my view, the fact that the Patent Act in its current state is
ill-equipped to deal appropriately with higher life forms as patentable subject
matter is an indication that Parliament never intended the definition of inven-
tion to extend to this type of subject matter”.
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For over 20 years now, the “modern principle” has been pre-
sented by the Supreme Court of Canada as THE approach to stat-
utory interpretation and the pronouncements have had a definite
influence in the way all Canadian courts justify interpretive deci-
sions, albeit not necessarily on the way they actually determine
statutory meaning. We have argued in this paper, however, that the
“modern principle” fails to provide courts with a satisfactory strat-
egy, either for selecting or for justifying the meaning of statutes. 
As a method of interpretation, Driedger’s quote remains inade-
quate and wanting in that it fails to reflect accurately some funda-
mental elements of the process by which Canadian legal actors,
including judges, ascertain legislative meaning. The construction of
statutes constitutes such a complex process, especially in the harder
cases that tend to end up in courts, that it is extremely difficult to
state the proper approach to interpretation in but a few words, if it
can be done at all. As professor Robert Summers wrote: “[I]t is at
best unlikely that a clear and generally acknowledged set of positive
rules governing interpretation exhaustively and authoritatively could
be formulated for any system of law today”189. At most, Driedger’s
quote provides a valid starting point190 for statutory interpretation,
but it cannot define, in and by itself, the approach to follow in all
cases.
As a framework for justification of interpretive decisions, the
“modern principle” encourages a style of judgement which is rather
formal: the expression of substantive reasons or policy considera-
tions for deciding a case one way or another has little or no place in
the process. One understands the reasons behind the rhetorical
caution felt appropriate by many judges in discharging the delicate
function of statutory construction. Essentially, the judiciary seeks
189 R.S. SUMMERS, loc. cit., note 146, 15.
190 Perhaps signe des temps, this expression “starting point” was actually used on
quite a few occasions lately, in R. v. Blais, supra, note 7, para. 16; R. v. Clay, supra,
note 7, para 55; and Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., supra, note 7,
para. 114.
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legitimacy in projecting an image of fidelity to the will of the elected
body of Government that is Parliament. One may ask, however, if it
is not time for Canadian courts to water down the traditional rhet-
oric of statutory interpretation and to openly acknowledge that the
construction of legislation may involve something more than the
mere “discovery” of an intention which would be “already there”. 
It may require courts, especially at the appellate level, to act in
a creative manner in order to clarify or supplement legislative pro-
visions, or even to make the necessary adjustments to have them
address an unforeseen or changing social reality. We trust that the
day will come when the justification of judicial interpretive decisions
in this country acknowledges more openly this simple fact, rather
than try to obscure it.
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